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CONTROL OF PATENTED AND COPYRIGHTED
ARTICLES AFTER SALE
The provision of the Federal Constitution under which Con-
gress acts in enacting patent or copyright laws is expressed in
very general terms:
"To promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited terms to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries."'
What is meant by an "exclusive right"? How far does this
control extend? ,Can it continue after absolute sale of the
patented or copyrighted article? What is, here, -the effect of that
principle of the common law that one cannot part with the fee of
chattels and at the same time annex conditions to their use? Is
the right of patent or copyright of such a nature that it protects
one to whom it is granted from the operation of statutes against
restraint of trade or unfair competition? Is there a difference
between the rights granted by patent laws and those granted by
copyright laws? These and similar questions have been often
before the courts in recent years; but the difficulty of reconciling
a body of law unknown to the common law2 with the principles
of that common law, and likewise of reconciling rights that are
essentially monopolies with enactments like the Sherman Lawn
and the more recent Clayton Law, 4 means -that many decisions are
yet necessary before we can speak authoritatively on all important
phases of our patent and copyright laws.
We will first consider our subject with reference to patents,
although much that is said of patents is equally applicable to
copyrights. However, when the Supreme -Court quotes with
approval a statement that there are such wide differences between
patents and copyrights that the cases which relate to the one
subject are not altogether controlling as to the other,5 it is per-
haps best not to think of them as too closely connected, and
I Art. I, sec. 8.
2 Gayler v. Wilder (1850) io How. (U. S.) 477, 493.
3 (189o) 26 St. at L. 209.
4 (1914) 38 St. at L. 730.
5 Park & Sons So. v. Hartman (19o7) 153 Fed. 24, 28, quoted in Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straits (198o) 201 U. S. 339, 345.
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to cite with considerable caution a patent case in a copyright
matter, and vice versa.
While the Constitution indicates that patentees are to be pro-
tected, the specific privileges to be accorded them are only such
as Congress may allow,6 and the statutory provision applicable
to patents as found in the Revised Statutes, the exact wording
of which it is well -to keep in mind in discussing the limitations
of any patent monopoly, is as follows:
"Every patent shall contain . ..... .. a grant to
the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seven-
teen years, of the exclusive right to make, use and vend
the invention or discovery ... ....... I
The restrictions which a patentee desires to impose has one or
both of two objects-he wishes either, (I) to limit the use of the
article in some particular manner, or, (2) to prevent its sale below
a certain price, usually fixed by himself. His method of seeking
to accomplish his object may be either, (I) by contracts with
vendees and subvendees, or, (2) by notices affixed to the patented
article by which he intends to bind anyone into whose hands the
same may come.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF A PATENTED ARTICLE
Lord Coke made a comment that very frequently appears in
brief or opinion in cases involving patent restrictions because
it is presumed to indicate a difficult problem in supporting a
restriction on use or price after sale:
"If a man be possessed of a horse or any other chattel,
real or personal, and give his whole interest or property
therein, upon condition that the donee or vendee shall not
alien the same, the same is void, because his whole interest
is out of him, so as he hath no possibility of reverter;
and it is against trade and traffic and bargaining and con-
tracting between man and man.""
Nlow the difficulty with a patent is that the patentee seems to
part with his entire interest and yet in many respects dictates, as
we shall see, what his vendee may do with the patented article.
6 Banks v. Manchester (1888) 128 U. S. 244.
7Rev. St. sec. 4884.
8 Coke, Litt. sec. 360.
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But this difficulty is more apparent than real, for it arises from
a failure to distinguish between the property right in the materials
composing a patented article, and the right of use for the purpose
and manner pointed out by the patent.' That distinction is
mentioned at the outset because so much loose thinking has
resulted from failure to apprehend it. The patent laws do not
give the patentee the right to sell or use his patented article-he
has these rights without a patent-but they do give him an incor-
poreal right, a right to exclude others from using his invention or
discovery,10 and that right--entirely distinct from the right of
property in the materials-is often of much greater value than
the materials of which the article is made.
But is should be noted that the patentee himself must separate
ownership and use, and evidence his intention so to do very
clearly, or he will find that he has no further control of his
product. Thus, there is a general rule that the unconditional or
unrestricted sale of a patented article conveys the entire use.
Even here, however, the distinction between the right of owner-
ship and the right of use has not been lost sight of; for as
Mr. Justice Luitop points out, "this right to use is nothing more
nor less than an tnrestricted license presumed from an uncon-
ditional sale," and the license itself passes no interest in .the
monopoly. He sums up the distinction, with his usual clearness,
in one succinct paragraph:
"We repeat. The property right to a patented machine
may pass to a purchaser with no right of use, or with
only the right to use in a specified way, or at a specified
place, or for a specified purpose. The unlimited right of
exclusive use which is possessed by and guaranteed to
the patentee will be granted if the sale be unconditional.
But if the right of use be confined by specific reserva-
tion, the use not permitted is necessarily reserved to the
patentee. If that reserved control of use of the machine
be violated, the patent is thereby invaded. The right to
sever ownership and use is deducible from the nature of
a patent monopoly and is recognizable in the cases.""'
Turning now to the cases suggested by our subhead, the deci-
sion of Circuit Judge Lurton in the so-called Button Fastener
9 Henry v. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 1, 24.
10 Jewett v. Atwood Suspender Co. (igoo) IOO Fed. 647, 648.
"Henry v. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. I, 24.
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case' 2 has been characterized by Chief Justice White, who
disagrees with it, as "the leading one of the cases which all
the others but follow."' 3
The owner of a patented machine for fastening buttons to
shoes with metallic fasteners sold the machine with a metal
label affixed thereto containing a statement, entitled, "Condition
of sale," as follows:
"This machine is sold and purchased to use only with
the fasteners made by the Peninsular Novelty Co., to
whom the title to said machine immediately reverts upon
violation of this contract of sale."
It was held that the label, conspicuously affixed, bound both
jobbers and their vendees, even though the patent owner did
not deal directly with users. But the court went further, and
enjoined the sale to the users of such machines of staples not
made by the complainant, but by a manufacturer of staples who
intended his staples to be used in complainant's machines.
Substantially similar facts brought the questions involved be-
fore the Supreme Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.Y
4 The
opinion in this case was also delivered by Mr. Justice Lurton.
A. B. Dick Company owned a patent covering a stencil dupli-
cating machine known as the "rotary mimeograph." It sold
to one Skou such a mimeograph, with a "license restriction"
attached to the machine as follows:
"This machine is sold by the A. B. Dick Company with
the license restriction that it may be used only with the
stencil, paper, ink and other supplies, made by A. B.
Dick Company, Chicago, U. S. A."
It is stated that -the Dick Company sold its machine at cost
or less, depending upon the profit realized from the sale of the
non-patented articles to be used with the machine for the gain
to be received from its invention. Henry sold to Skou a can of
ink suitable for use upon the said mimeograph, with knowledge
of the said license agreement, and with the expectation that ,it
would be used in connection with the said mimeograph. The
ink sold to Skou was not covered by the claims of the patent.
12 (1896) 77 Fed. 288.
IsHenry v. Dick Co. (x912) 224 U. S. 1, 68.
14 (i912) 224 U. S. I.
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It was held that this act of Henry's constituted contributory
infringement of complainant's patent.15
It should be noted how far these cases go. In each, the suit
is not against one having any contractual relation or privity
with the patentee but against a maker of an unpatented article
in ordinary use. The patentee admittedly has no exclusive right
to the manufacture of this unpatented article and his only control
over its use arises out of his patent on his machine. The notice
which binds the licensee, or the third party, need not rest in
contract, but is sufficiently brought home by attaching the label
containing the same to the machine.
Few recent decisions have attracted as much attention as the
Dick case, and the fact that it was actually decided by a minority
of the full membership of the court will probably bring the
question once more before our highest tribunal. In fact, the
decision in Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell,"8 which we shall comment
on later in this article, has already much shaken it.
The dissent of the Chief Justice is interesting as showing what
would be the probable basis of a contrary ruling, were the court
ever to reverse itself. His chief objection is that the doctrine
laid down by the majority places in the hands of the patentee a
"virtual legislative authority" over every person, without refer-
ence to privity of contract between patentee and his vendee.17
He puts various illustrations of the extremes to which this doc-
trine may lead-a patentee selling a patent engine may 'now
bring under the patent laws all contracts for coal or electrical
energy needed to work the machine, a patentee of a carpenter's
plane may by contract prescribe that the same may only be used
on lumber from trees grown on the land of a particular person
or sawed by a particular mill, and so on.' s
Furthermore, he says, this decision loses sight of a distinc-
tion made many years ago by this court-the difference between
the rights of a patentee protected by a patent, and the rights of
a patentee which merely arise from contract, and therefore are
25Four judges, Lurton, McKenna, Holmes and Van Devanter, JJ.,
formed the majority, and three, White, C. J., Hughes and Lamar, JJ.,
dissented. A petition for a rehearing, in which the Attorney General and
Solicitor General joined, was denied.
16 (1913) 229 U. S. I.
17Henry v. Dick Co. (I912) 224 U. S. 1, 54.
28 Henry v. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. I, 55.
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subject only to the general law of the particular jurisdiction.' 9
This, said the Chief Justice, was a sale of all the rights which
the patent protected (in spite of the so-called license restric-
tion. And the decision also fails to note the distinction between
the grant of the right to make and vend a patented machine,
and the grant of the right to use it. When the patentee, for
example, sells the exclusive privilege of making or vending the
machine for use in a particular place, the purchaser buys a por-
tion of the franchise which the patent confers but the purchaser
of the machine who intends to use it in the ordinary pursuits
of life stands on different ground; for in using it he does not
derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or exclusive privilege
granted by act of Congress, but by reason of the laws of prop-
erty of the particular state in which it is located.
20
It seems possible to answer these objections. There is an
obvious remedy to the danger of great public inconvenience
suggested by the Chief Justice in that, as Justice Lurton points
out,2 1 the public is always free to take or refuse the patented
article on the terms imposed by the patentee. If he chooses to
place onerous burdens on users, he will speedily find himself
without a market. To the contention that many patented articles
are almost necessaries and the public will suffer if their use is
unduly burdened it may be said that it is the undoubted policy
of our patent laws to give the patentee practically absolute power
during the life of his patent for the sake of the compensation that
will come to the public when it shall be open to unrestricted use.
He may be as capricious as he wishes-he may refuse to use it
himself and at the same time prevent others from doing so.
22
He has "a constitutional and statutory monopoly" 23 and he can
say, in the language of Holy Writ, to anyone who makes objec-
tion, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine
own?"
And when we come to examine the cases cited by the Chief
Justice, we find that those on which he places greatest reliance
are cases of unconditional sales, where the general rule that we
'
9 Henry v. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 1, 56 ff., citing Wilson v. Sanford
(i85o) io How. (U. S.) 99.
20 Citing Bloomer v. McQuewan (1852) 14 How. (U. S.) 539.
21Henry v. Dick Co. (I912) 224 U. S. I, 34.
22 Paper Bag Patent Case (igo8) 210 U. S. 405.
2 3Henry v. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. 1, 35.
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have mentioned applies, namely, the sale conveys the entire use.
It is difficult to see how a suit for infringement, which must
turn upon the scope of the monopoly or privilege secured to a
patentee, does not present a case arising under the patent laws.
This is not a claim for damages for breach of contract, nor for
payment of royalties, but a claim which, construed one way, gives
rights under the patent laws and, construed another, defeats
those rights. 24
On the whole, the decision in Henry v. Dick Co. seems right.
When we turn to the language of the patent statute--"to make,
use and vend"-we can well say, as a matter of construction,
that things necessary to the use of the patented article come
within the purview of the statute. The monopoly in the unpat-
ented article used with the patented machine is strictly incidental
to the use of the machine, concerns nothing but its actual use
and arises from the peculiar merits of the machine-the very
thing the patent laws are intended to cover. When some one
else shall invent a more ingenious machine, then this machine
will be superseded and with it will go any monopoly the patentee
might have in the unpatented article. 25
Nor does the decision appear to be as broad as the minority
opinion would make it. It would seem to be confined to articles
actually necessary to the use of the pattented article-ink for the
rollers, stencils for mimeographing, etc.-and not necessarily to
embrace the completed products that come from the machine or
materials on which the machine is to do some work. The deci-
sion does not read that only cloth manufactured by a certain mill
shall be used on a patented sewing-machine, or only pencils made
by a certain manufacturer shall be sharpened in a patented pencil-
sharpener. This is a close distinction-so close, at times, that
it is difficult to tell where daylight ends and dark begins. 28  How-
ever, it is submitted that the distinction is a sound one when the
court specifically confines its decision to "things necessary to the
use of the patented article. '27
2 4 Henry v. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. I, 16.
25 Button Fastener case (1896) 77 Fed. 288, 296.
26 For example, in the Dick case (1912) 224 U. S. i, the license covered
paper-a material necessary to operate the machine and not the completed
product coming from it.
2T Henry v. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. I, 36. The English authorities
are in accord with the Dick case, pp. 39-43.
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RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRICE OF A PATENTED ARTICLE
Is any difference to be made between a restriction on use and
a restriction on price?
The Revised Statutes give the patentee three exclusive rights:
to make, to use, to vend, and these rights are several so that
one may be given without the other two. 2  It therefore be-
comes necessary to interpret the meaning to be attached to each
of the three words, and we are here, of course, concerned with
the connotation to be given the word, "vend." Does the
exclusive right to "vend" carry with it the power by notice to
limit the price at which future retail sales of the patented article
may be made?
The Supreme Court has answered that question in the fairly
recent case of Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell.29  The defendant, a
retail druggist, purchased from jobbers who had purchased from
plaintiff at the full price demanded by plaintiff, original packages
of a patented medicine known as "Sanatogen." On these pack-
ages was a "Notice to the Retailer" which read that the package
was licensed for sale and use at a price not less than one dollar;
that any sale at a less price was an infringement of the patent;
that a purchase was an acceptance of this condition and all rights
reverted to the patentee in the event of violation. Defendant
sold packages at less than one dollar and the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia certified the following question to the
Supreme Court:
"Did the acts of the appellee, in retailing at less than
the price fixed in said notice, original packages of 'Sana-
togen' purchased of jobbers as aforesaid, constitute
infringement of the appellants' patent '?" 3
The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative.
31
The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Day, who had taken
no part in the decision of the Dick case, and the four justices
who comprised the majority in that case here dissented without
opinion.
It is submitted the Sanatogen case and the Dick case cannot
both be upheld, although the court professes to distinguish the
latter. The court in the Sanatogen case uses this language:
28 Henry v. Dick Co. (1912) 224 U. S. I, 46.
29 (1913) 229 U. S. I.
30 Batter & Cie v. O'Donnell (913) 229 U. S. I, 9.
31 Accord, Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Straus (915) 222 Fed. 524.
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"The patentee had no interest in the proceeds of the sub-
sequent sales, no right to any royalty thereon or to par-
ticipation in the profits thereof. The packages were sold
with as full and complete title as any article could have
when sold in the open market, excepting only the attempt
to limit the sale or use when sold for not less than one
dollar. In other words, the title transferred was full
and complete with an at-tempt to reserve the right to fix
the price at which subsequent sales could be made. There
is no showing of a qualified sale for less than value for
limited use with other articles only, as was shown in the
Dick case. There was no transfer of a limited right to
use this invention, and to call the sale a license to use is
a mere play upon words.8 2
It is not a license to use, certainly, but here we are concerned
with the right to vend. Justice Day says the right to vend
conferred by the patent law has been exercised when the package
was sold with a full and complete title as any article could have
been in the open market. But what was the exclusive right to
vend given by the patent laws? Was it merely to sell the
article? The patent law did-not give that right, for the patentee
always had it, irrespective of any patent. And does it matter
that the materials composing the package were sold with an
absolutely full and complete title? A property right in the mere
goods is entirely separate and distinct from an interest in the
monopoly. Mr. Justice Lurton made that clear in the Dick case.
It is true that there he was talking about the distinction between
the property right in the goods and the right to control use, but
is there not a similar distinction between the property right in
the goods and the right to vend? If the word, "vend," is to
have any particular meaning in the patent law, it is submitted
it must be taken to refer to the conditions which may be imposed
on subsales. The meaning given it in the Sanatogen case is
nothing more than a mere truism-that a man may sell his own
property. Test the court's interpretation of "vend" by inquir-
ing what rights this interpretation gives the patentee that he
would not have if it were struck out of the law. If the patent
law merely referred to "the exclusive right to make and use,"
no one else could sell because no one else could make.
The court says that here (unlike the Button Fastener or Dick
cases) there was no showing of, a qualified sale for less than
82 (1913) 229 U. S. x, 16.
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value for limited use with other articles only. This remark
seems to indicate that in the court's mind it is of some impor-
tance whether or not the patentee sells the article at its real
worth. If that is a correct interpretation, aside from the diffi-
cult problem of proving whether an article is sold at or below
cost, it would be interesting to inquire how that fact has any
bearing on the question of what rights are protected by a patent.
If the patentees of Sanatogen had received the full purchase
price which satisfied them, whether that price was one dollar or
one cent, the purchaser would have that "full and complete
title" on which the court based its decision.
On three grounds, at least, it is submitted the decision in
Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell should not be supported:
(I) It ignores the fundamental distinction between the right
of property in the patented article and the monopoly given by
the patent law.
(2) It interprets "the exclusive right to vend" given by the
patent law in a manner that makes that phrase devoid of
meaning.
(3) It opens an opportunity for much useless discussion of
the value and sale price of patented articles.33
RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRICE OF A COPYRIGHTED ARTICLE
The language of the copyright law is as follows:
"The author . . . shall . . . have the sole
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, complet-
ing, copying, executing, finishing and vending the
same.
The leading case on the right to restrict the price of a copy-
righted article, is Bobbs-Merrll Co. v. Straus et al.,35 in which
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court. The defend-
ants were sued by the plaintiff to restrain the sale of a copy-
righted novel, entitled, The Castaway, at a price less than
3 For cases contra, see Bement v. National Harrow Co. (19o2) 186
U. S. 70, 91, and the cases cited in Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman (i9o7)
153 Fed. 24, 27.
34 Rev. St. 4952; 33 St. at L. iooo.
35 (1908) 210 U. S. 339. The defendants were R. H. Macy & Co., a
New York department store which has done much to settle the law on the
subjects we are discussing.
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one dollar. Immediately below the copyright notice on the
page following the title page was the following notice:
"The price of this book at retail is one dollar net; no
dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at
a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
copyright."
The defendants purchased most of their supply from whole-
sale dealers at a price below -the retail price by about forty per
cent, and it was conceded that both the wholesale dealers and
defendants knew of the notice, but the former were under no
agreement to enforce the same.
The decision was that the owner of the copyright could not,
in the absence of contract or license, restrict future sales of the
book at retail to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy,
even" though the notice was brought home to one undertaking to
sell for less than the named sum.
At this time the court was under the necessity of holding the
patent cases -to be no precedent, for the decision in the Bement
case"0 and many cases in the lower courts, were contrary, but it is
interesting to note that as soon as this necessity disappeared,
the same court and the same judge thought that,
"the right to vend secured in the patent statute is not
distinguishable from the right of vending given in the
copyright aot. In both instances it was the intention of
Congress to secure an exclusive right to sell, and there is
no grant of a privilege to keep up prices and prevent
competition by notices restricting the price at which the
article may be resold.13 7
Thus, to-day, the price of neither a patented nor a copyrighted
article may be fixed by the patentee or copyright owner, merely
by a notice attached to the article.
It will be noted that aside from the Bement case, -the cases,
both patent and copyright, which we have been considering deal
with questions of restriction by license notice. There have been
no recent contract cases before the Supreme Court.
If the use of a patented article may be restricted by mere
license notice, as in the Dick case, then a fortiori it may be
restricted by actual agreement, as in the Bement case. But if
86 (I9o) I86 U. S. 70.
37 Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell (1913) 229 U. S. I, 17.
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the price of a patented or copyrighted article may not be fixed by
mere license notice (as the law now stands), may the same be
done by contract?
Prior to the decisions in the Bobbs-Merril case and the Bauer
case, there was no doubt of the right to fix price by contract.
This had been decided in numerous cases in the lower Federal
courts of whica perhaps the leading one was Victor Talking
Machine Co. v. The Fair,38 but these cases have raised some
question in the lower courts as to just what emphasis the
Supreme Court intended to place on the license-notice feature.
The most satisfactory discussion of this question, so far, is
found in the case of American Graphophone Co. v. Boston
Store.3 9
This case concludes that the Bauer case was not intended to
cover price restriction by contract. The Bauer case dealt with
a situation where no part of the patent monopoly had been
reserved (since it was held that a mere notice was not sufficient
to reserve it) but there was no dictum that no part of the patent
monopoly could be reserved if there was an express agreement
as to price, and, as the language of the Bauer case was limited
to the precise facts, we are still justified in holding that an
agent or vendee of a patentee may, by direct covenant or agree-
ment, bind himself to the observance of a price restriction.
This is sound reasoning, as the Bobbs-Merrill and Bauer cases
dealt with the method by which the patentee sought to restrict
the price, not the lawfulness of price fixing, in general. The
latter question is concerned primarily with how far price restric-
tions on patented or copyrighted articles are affected by anti-
trust and anti-monopoly legislation-the most interesting phase
of our subject, to which we now come.
EFFECT OF ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION ON PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS
Patents and copyrights, as we have seen, are essentially
monopolies. It is the deliberate policy of the law, based on the
Constitution itself, to make them such by a grant of exclusive
rights and privileges. We also have seen that even though
the patentee or copyright owner should capriciously refuse to
allow anyone, even himself, to have the benefit of his invention,
38 (19o3) 1-23 Fed. 424.
39 (i915) 225 Fed. 785.
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his discovery, his book, he has that right. Mere characterization,
therefore, of a patent or copyright as a monopoly does not even
raise a presumption against its legality.
':Cries of restraint of trade and impairment of thefreedom of sales are unavailing, because for the promo-
tion of the useful arts the constitution and statutes
authorize the very monopoly. 40
But, on the other hand, patents and copyrights are but a
species of property and subject, as is all other property, to the
law of the land.41 There are limitations on the rights of the
patentee and the copyright owner to deal with his own. Some
of these limitations are easy enough to discover. For example,
a patented device for gambling is not immune from state attack42
and a burning oil which a state declares to be unsafe cannot be
sold because it happens to be patented.43 In general, we may
say that the rules of public policy and the police power apply to
patents and copyrights equally with all other property.
But when the patent or copyright monopoly is attacked on
the ground that it violates those rules against monopolies and
restraint of trade which Congress itself has established, we
have questions of inherent difficulty. How far must the monop-
oly granted by one statute be restrained and limited by the
provision against monopolies in another statute or, paraphras-
ing Judge Lurton,44 when can we say that a monopoly created
by law can be taken away by law?
There is a frank recognition of the fact that the patent and
copyright laws often act as shields to monopolies which, lacking
that protection, cannot be upheld under the Sherman law. This
was brought out very clearly in two decisions, in one of which
Circuit Judge Lurton delivered the opinion of a circuit court of
appeals,"5 and in the other, Mr. Justice Hughes spoke for the
Supreme 'Court.4
40 Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair (19o3) 123 Fed. 423; and
see The Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co. (I915) 224 Fed.
566, 572.41 Button Fastener case (1896) 77 Fed. 288, 293.
42 Vannini v. Paine (1832) I Harr. (Del.) 65.
"3Patterson v. Kentucky (1878) 97 U. S. 5oi.
"Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman (1907) 153 Fed. 24, 32.
45Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman ('9o7) 153 Fed. 24.
46Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. (ig1) 22o U. S. 373.
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In each of these cases the owner of a secret process or formula
for manufacturing a proprietary medicine attempted by a system
of contracts to control the price at which all sales by dealers
at wholesale or retail should be made. In neither case, how-
ever, was the medicine patented. Defendants were alleged to
have refused to make such contracts with plaintiffs as other
wholesale dealers and jobbers had made, and to have induced
such wholesale dealers and jobbers to break their agreements
with plaintiffs, by selling to defendants below the prices set by
plaintiffs.
It was held in each case that plaintiffs' attempts to control
prices on all sales of their products was in restraint of trade and
violative of the Sherman Act. To plaintiffs' contention that
there was an analogy between the owner of a patent and the
owner of a secret medical process, the Supreme Court answered
that in the one case there is a statutory grant, in the other there
is none, and the maker of a proprietary medicine, unpatented,
stands on no different footing from that of any other manufac-
turer.47 The patent and copyright laws give a privilege because
the public will ultimately benefit from such grant, but the owner
of a secret process or formula gives nothing, and is not bound
ever to reveal his process, and hence, there should be no policy
of the law protecting him in any particular manner.
48
This brings us to a consideration of the cases where the
question of monopoly has arisen in patent and copyright cases
proper.
In the case of Bement v. National Harrow Co., the earliest of
the cases we are considering, the question was raised; but the
court was clearly of the opinion that, even under the then
prevailing doctrine that the Sherman Act forbade any restraint
of commerce, reasonable or unreasonable, the Act was not appli-
cable to the facts of that case.
"But that statute clearly does not refer to that kind
of restraint of interstate commerce which may arise from
reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee
or licensee of a patent by the owner thereof, restricting
the terms upon which the article may be used and the
price to be demanded therefor. Such a construction of
the act we have no doubt was never contemplated by its
framers." 49
47 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. (19i) 22o U. S. 373, 402 f.
48park & Sons Co. v. Hartman (I9O7) 153 Fed. 24, 32.
49 (1902) 186 U. S. 70, 92.
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In Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, ° decided shortly after the
Sherman Act went into effect, the question of patent monopoly
could have been raised, but it does not seem to have been
touched upon. In that case the court refused to compel specific
performance of a contract wherein the defendant, in considera-
tion of receiving a license to use certain patents, agreed never
to dispute the validity of the same, nor plaintiff's title thereto,
and never to import, manufacture, or sell any machines or devices
covered by certain other patents not owned by plaintiffs. The
decision, however, was put on the broad ground of public policy.
The case that finally brought the point squarely before the
Supreme Court was Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U. S.,51
familiarly known as the Bath Tub Trust case. Here, six-
teen corporate and thirty-four individual defendants, manufac-
turers of enameled ware, agreed not to sell their products to
jobbers except at a price fixed by a committee of six of their
number. The jobbers were brought into the agreement, and
unless they made the desired agreement could obtain no enameled
ware from any manufacturer in the combination (which em-
braced eighty-five per cent of the entire trade). One condi-
tion was not to resell to plumbers except at the prices determined
by the manufacturers. A defense set up to the Government's
suit against a combination so obviously in violation of the Sher-
man Act was that this agreement was a means employed by the
defendants of protecting several patents in their control, and that
the form. of the license followed the precedents which gave the
owner of an invention the power to grant to others its use, or
to withhold it, or to grant it upon such terms as he may choose
to impose. The court, however, likened the case to a similar
combination already condemned, where no patents were in-
volved,52 and then stated:
"The added element of the patent in the case at bar can-
not confer immunity from a like condemnation, for the
reasons we have stated....... Rights
conferred by patents are indeed very definite and exten-
sive, but they do not give any more -than other rights an
universal license against positive prohibitions. The Sher-
man law is a limitation of rights, rights which may be
pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained. 5 3
50 (i892) 144 U. S. 224.
51 (1912) 226 U. S. 20.
52 Montague & Co. v. Lowry (i9o4) 193 U. S. 38.
53Standard Mfg. Co. v. U. S. (1912) 226 U. S. 20, 49.
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Turning to copyrights, we find a similar decision in the case
of Straus v. American Publisher's Association et al.54  The
plaintiffs (R. H. Macy & Co.) asked for an injunction restrain-
ing any interference with their purchase and sale of copyrighted
books. Because the plaintiffs refused to maintain the retail
prices set by them, the defendants, the publishers' association
composed of seventy-five per cent of the publishers of copy-
righted and uncopyrighted books in the United States, and the
booksellers' association which included a majority of the book-
sellers throughout the United States, issued "cut-off lists,"
directing the discontinuance of the sale of copyrighted books to
the plaintiffs, and issued circulars -to the trade at large, warning
all persons against dealing with the plaintiffs or other price-
cutters. The Court of Appeals of New York held that so far as
uncopyrighted books were concerned, the agreement was illegal
and granted an injunction and damages; but that, as to copy-
righted books, the agreement was justified by the copyright act,
and was not within the denunciation of the Sherman Act.
55
The Supreme Court reversed that judgment and held the com-
bination illegal in either aspect. First quoting the extract given
above from the Bath Tub Trust case, it proceeded:
"So, in the present case it cannot be successfully con-
tended -that the monopoly of a copyright is in this respect
any more extensive than that secured under the patent
law. No more than the patent statute was the copyright
act intended to authorize agreements in unlawful restraint
of trade and tending to monopoly, in violation of the
specific terms of the Sherman Law, which is broadly
designed to reach all combinations in unlawful restraint
of trade and tending because of the agreements or com-
binations entered into to build up and perpetuate monop-
olies." 58
We have perhaps cited enough of these cases to make some
generalizations on the theory seeming to run through them all.
It is worthy of note that the cases in which the court has declined
to protect the monopoly granted by the patent or copyright
statutes, by holding a restriction on resale price illegal or unen-
forceable, fall into one of two classes:
54 (1913) 231 U. S. 222.
55 Straus v. American Publisher's Association et al. (igio) i99 N. Y. 548.
58 Straus v. American Publisher's Association et al. (1913) 231 U. S. 222,
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(i) The merchandise in question has been of such a charac-
ter that the original vendor produced or marketed all of the same
or similar merchandise. There could be no substitution except
by the use of goods entirely different, so far as the purchaser
could ascertain. Thus in the Bauer case, -there was a patented
medicine, "Sanatogen," made under a secret process, in the
Bobbs-Merrill case there was a copyrighted book, and in Park
& Sons Co. v. Hartman and the Dr. Miles Medical Co. cases,
there were unpatented proprietary medicines, secretly com-
pounded. That -there would be an actual monopoly, even though
there is a patent or copyright, is obviously of weight in the court's
mind and a fortiori when no patent or copyright is involved.
Thus in the Peruna case Judge Lurton says:
"It is true that the complainant is not in combination
with other makers of Peruna. There are no others. If
there were there would not be a complete or general
restraint; for it might then happen that those others,
not being bound by any covenants, could supply the
public."'5
7
(2) The restrictions (in the language of the Standard Sani-
tary Mfg. Co. case) "transcend what was necessary to pr6tect
the use of the patent or the monopoly which the law conferred
upon it,"58 and the same is true of the copyright cases.
Thus, in the case just cited, the restrictions were not reason-
able and legal conditions attached to the use of the patented
invention, so they restrained trade and promoted monopolization
of commerce in articles not patented. The restrictions had
nothing whatever to do with the use of the patented tool, but
applied to acts subsequent to its use. Compare the Dick case in
which the restriction named, prevented the use of paper which
had not been supplied by the patentee but was a restriction
only effective at the time of the use of the patented article.
There was no attempt to control the output of the mimeograph
nor to fix the price at which the users of the mimeograph should
sell the mimeographed copies. After the Dick decision, persons
were as free to manufacture paper, stencils and inks as before.
The Dick company had no control over either the source of
supply or tle demand for those unpatented articles, and the
57 Parks & Sons Co. v. Hartman (1907) 153 Fed. 24.
58 (1912) 226 U. S. 20, 48.
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market was only curtailed as to the person who bought the
patented mimeograph. On the other hand, the combination in
the Sanitary case intended to control and did control every phase
of the combination in enameled wares; for unless the jobbers
entered the combination they could obtain no enameled ware from
the manufacturers of eighty-five per cent of the product. 9 And
similarly in the American Publisher's case, the effect of defend-
ants' "cut-off lists" was not merely to prevent the plaintiffs get-
ting copyrighted books but "books of any kind at any price,"
except through a very small source of supply, and so, as the
court says, -the agreement "manifestly went beyond any fair and
legal agreement to protect prices and trade."60
Recent cases not involving patents or copyrights have upheld
price-fixing, and, just as the cases that have denounced it, have
laid emphasis on the fact of monopoly, so these cases have
stressed the non-monopolistic features of the price-fixer's busi-
ness. Thus, in Fisher Flouring Mills v. Swanson, the court
said:
"Such a contract as that here in question is of interest
to the public only when the whole of the given commodity,
or a measurable approximation to the whole of that given
commodity, is in the control of one of the contracting
parties, or of some combination of which he is a member
or which dictates his policy." 1
In a case of great interest, The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea
Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co.,6 2 Judge Hough pointed out that if
the defendant's refusal to do business with -the plaintiff "affected
a necessity of life, or even a staple article of trade, the matter
might be serious," but as defendant handled less than one per
cent of the total product in question, it could not in any sense be
said to have a monopoly.63
It would be interesting to have a patent or copyright case
now arise where there was an attempt by license notice to restrict
price on an article which could practically be duplicated, without
59 Argument of counsel, Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. case (i912) 226
U. S. 20, 31, 32, 47.
60 Straus v. American Publisher's Association (1913) 231 U. S. 222, 236.
61 (913) 76 Wash. 649, 66o.
62 (1915) 224 Fed. 566.; Rome G. Brown, The Right to Refuse to Sell,
25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 194.
63 The writer has been greatly aided by the briefs loaned him by the
counsel in that case.
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infringement, by purchase in the open market, or in other words,
where the patentee or copyright owner could not be said to
have anything partaking of the nature of a monopoly. Whether
the Supreme Court would permit price-fixing where there was
no monopoly seems doubtful. The tendency of their decisions
is the other way. The American Publisher's case gave some
attention to the monopolistic feature of the defendant's agree-
ment but the Bauer case had nothing to say on that score except
to remark that while it was doubtless within the power of
Congress to confer on a patentee the right to fix the price of an
article of general use, it had not yet done so. 64
The question remains as one of the interesting speculations
suggested by our subject. We must wait for further decisions
before it can be said that the policy of the Federal Courts toward
price-fixing where there is no monopoly is definitely determined.
Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, in the Dr. Miles
Medical Co. case, 5 written in his usual clear and lucid style, dis-
cusses price-fixing in its broader aspects. He believes that the
value to the public of competition in production or distribution
as fixing a fair price is greatly exaggerated. What really fixes
prices is the competition of conflicting desires. None of us
having enough of all the things that we want, we must choose.
As soon as the price of something we want goes up beyond the
point at which we are willing to give up other -things to have
it, we cease to buy it and buy something else. Hence fair price
should be determined by what he terms the equilibrium of social
desires, and not by artificial attempts to stimulate competition.
This, of course, is Justice Lurton's argument in the Dick case
with reference to a patented article, and, it is submitted, a view
that has logic and common sense with it.
Justice Holmes specifically excepts from his reasoning things
which we cannot get along without--"there may be necessaries
that sooner or later must be dealt with like short rations in a ship-
wreck, but they are not Dr. Miles's medicines."
64Judge Hough has this footnote to the Cream of Wheat case (I915)
224 Fed. 566, 575: "It is an interesting speculation, whether national price
regulation, embracing compulsory sales, could not be reached by a system
of federal licenses as a prerequisite for interstate business. Semble that
submission to such prospective regulatory orders might be exacted as
the price of license."
65 (I91i) 220 U. S. 373, 409.
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It may be that the court will eventually take the viewpoint
that where the monopoly of the patent or the copyright can be
maintained without the creation of a general monopoly in a
necessary of life, there will be no objection in public policy to
permitting price-fixing by the patentee or copyright owner. It
must be admitted, however, that our "present enthusiasm for
regulating the prices to be charged by other people," as Justice
Holmes terms it, is against this view. It should be a question of
the balance of convenience-"no more restraint than necessary
to afford a fair protection to the business of the complainant
and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the public," 68
or, as similarly laid down in the Dr. Miles case:
"Public welfare is first considered and if it be not
involved, and the restraint upon one party is not greater
than protection to the other party requires, the contract
may be sustained."' 7
There seems a tendency to define the word, "monopoly,' too
narrowly. Because a certain concern has a monopoly in all of
"Sanatogen" or "Peruna" or "Cream of Wheat," it does not
necessarily follow that the public interest will suffer because of
price restrictions. These may be monopolies in mere names and
not in commodities. Of course, that was literally true in the
Cream of Wheat case, where the name simply designated a very
small percentage of purified middlings, but it is practically true
in the case of these proprietary medicines as well, for I venture
to assert that no single one of them is so unique and indispensable
that it would be greatly detrimental to the public if the makers
were permitted to fix their own prices. A price too high would
permit users to turn to many substitutes fully as good.
There is a consideration involved in cases like the American
Publisher's case which should be kept in mind, and that is
whether the injunction sought against patent and copyright own-
ers may not, as a practical matter, compel the owner to sell his
goods to one with whom he prefers not to have business dealings.
"It is not unlawful for a person to refuse to deal with others as
his judgment, or fancy, may impel him."68 The Cream of Wheat
66Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman (i9o7) 153 Fed. 24, 43.
6T(1g1) 220 U. S. 373, 406.
6s Gray, J., dissenting in Straus v. American Publisher's Associatiou
(1914) z77 N. Y. 473, 490.
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case shows this plainly enough, but when he agrees with others
that he will refuse to sell except under certain conditions, he
may have entered an unlawful combination, as is brought out
by the American Publisher's case.
The vital difference is the fact of a combination and it is, of
course, a distinction very frequently made and well grounded.
The court, in dissolving the book publishers' and book-sellers'
combination, did not order any single defendant to do business
with the plaintiffs. Suppose, however, there had been one large
defendant corporation controlling all this trade and no com-
bination to attack, what would have been the substance of the
court's decree? In the light of the Standard Oil case,6 9 it is
possible to say that the court lays more stress on the fact of
monopoly than on the detail whether the monopoly is created by
the acts of one owner or of a combination of owners. Nb case
has yet-told us what would be the treatment accorded the large
corporation with a patent or copyright monopoly of something
akin to a necessary of life. While it is unlikely, it is not at all
imp6ssible for such a situation to arise, and it is certain that we
may look for more interesting decisions which will discuss more




69 (1911) 221 U. S. 1.
